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Abstract 
Enactivism  has  the  potential  to  provide  a  sense  of  teleology  in  purpose-
directed  action,  but  without  violating  the  principles  of  efficient  causation. 
Action can be distinguished from mere reaction by virtue of the fact that some 
systems are self-organizing. Self-organization in the brain is reflected in neu-
ral plasticity, and also in the primacy of motivational processes that initiate 
the  release  of  neurotransmitters  necessary  for mental and  conscious  func-
tions, and which guide selective attention processes. But in order to flesh out 
the enactivist approach in a way that is plausible and not merely an epiphe-
nomenon, it is necessary to confront the problem of causal closure in a serious 
way. Atoms and molecules in the brain do not violate the normal causal prin-
ciples that govern them in other contexts. The theory of self-organizing dy-
namical systems must be developed in a way that is compatible with causal 
closure rather than contradicting it. 
Keywords: Enactive; self-organization; dynamical systems; neural plasticity; 
causal closure. 
Introduction 
Clinical  psychologists  tend  to  view  human  behavior  in  teleological  terms, 
while experimentalists (including many of those same clinicians when adopt-
ing a more theoretical stance) view all causation as efficient, with human ac-
tions appearing not so much as self-initiated actions, but as reactions to stimu-
li. The enactive approach to cognition can go a long way toward reconciling 
these different perspectives. When enactivism is grounded in a sober analysis 
of  causal  relations  and  neural  mechanisms  (as  in  Kauffman  2003;  Monod 
1971), it can make room for organismic purposes that drive both action and 
the nature of re-actions. Multiple realizability and neural plasticity are major 
components of this analysis. In such processes, the same organizational activi-
ty can make use of different sets of micro-level components, which the organ-
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ism actively appropriates and replaces as needed, insofar as possible given 
environmental conditions and the organism’s particular needs. 
However,  the  structure  of  causal  analyses  within  enactivist  and  self-orga-
nizational theory must be taken more seriously than often is done. Vague talk 
of “higher level” processes that “constrain” causal relations at a lower level 
can be misleading or even meaningless. The problem of causal closure (Kim 
1992, 1998) must be confronted rather than merely talked around. When the 
causal analyses are done in a careful way, and integrated with the motiva-
tional systems of the brain that orchestrate self-initiated and self-energized 
actions, explanations can remain consistent with normal efficient causal pro-
cesses that are by no means violated by the atoms and molecules that make 
up the nervous system. Yet at the same time, enactivist cognitive theory com-
bined  with  the  neurological  phenomena  of  neural  plasticity  and  the  seri-
ous working  out  of  self-organizational  causal  theory  can  make  room  for 
a meaningful distinction between action and a merely complicated sequence 
of re-actions. 
This paper will attempt to provide an overview of the path that can lead from 
self-organizational causal theory, through mechanisms of neural plasticity in 
the nervous system that serve organismic purposes, to the primacy of moti-
vated selective anticipation in perception, to the enactivist manifestations of 
these mechanisms in cognitive processes. I will refer here to examples of the 
timing and interactions of brain mechanisms in perception, imagination, and 
motivated attention direction (discussed more fully in Ellis 1995, 2005; Ellis 
and Newton 2010) that illustrate the primacy of purposeful processes of the 
anticipatory (Freeman 2001) and searching (Panksepp 1998, 2012) functions of 
the motivational brain. These self-energizing and anticipatory systems lead to 
views of cognitive functions that fit nicely with enactivist approaches such as 
those of Noë (2006) and Thompson (2007). 
But equally important, I will also discuss the philosophical analyses that are 
needed to reconcile self-organizational and enactive processes (the “autopoie-
sis” emphasized by Thompson) with the problem of causal closure of physical 
systems. More is needed for this reconciliation than merely multiple realiza-
tion; we need a concept of a particular kind of multiply realizable system in 
which the overall pattern of organization is of such a nature that it shows 
a tendency to appropriate, replace, and reproduce the components of its own 
definitive patterns of activity by virtue of the organized way it exchanges en-
ergy and materials with the environment (Newton 2000). Such a theory has 
been extensively developed by Stuart Kauffman (1993) and Scott Kelso (1995). 
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Science and subjectivity 
“Psychology as a science” is a strange expression. It means eliminating from 
the study of the psyche—the subject of experience—everything that does not 
present itself in the form of an object of experience. Above all, this means 
eliminating  teleology,  because  modern  science  explains  things  from  the 
standpoint of mechanistic causal relations. Rolls (1999), for example, explains 
emotion in these terms, and the account of perceptual processing is standard-
ly framed in terms of sequences of efficient causes in the brain (for example, 
see any standard textbook such as H.R. Schiffman 2001). John Bickle (2008) 
expresses the philosophical rationale for rejecting teleology in favor of reduc-
tionist causal accounts. When I decide to raise my hand, and then do so, we 
must explain the causes of motion for a measurable and observable physical 
mass. Modern science therefore must explain the raising of the hand in terms 
of objectively observable physical causes. And this means in terms of the elec-
tro-chemical reactions in the nervous system, which can be reduced to a series 
of micro-level causal sequences. These causal sequences occur at a level at 
which things obey the laws of classical Newtonian mechanics, and thus are 
causally closed. If physical antecedents are necessary and sufficient as an ex-
planation of them, then the conscious correlates of those physical antecedents 
can  play  no  causal  role,  unless  we  completely  reduce  consciousness  to  its 
physical components. This equation of the conscious with its physical compo-
nents is now a standard solution to this problem, endorsed for example by 
Bickle  as  the  only  reasonable  way  to  make  physical  and  mental  causation 
compatible with each other.  If consciousness is reducible to a physical se-
quence of micro-level events, then it can have the same causal powers as that 
sequence of events. 
And even if we do opt for a strict identity between consciousness and its phys-
ical correlates, the past century of work on psychophysical monism still seems 
to leave us with only mechanistic causes—but with some of them correlating 
with mental events—and thus without any real teleological causal relations, 
but only a subjective impression of one. Instead of raising my hand for the 
purpose of reaching the coffee cup, strictly speaking, I am raising it because of 
neurophysiological  events  that  correlate  with  the  image  of  the  coffee  cup, 
which then physically triggers a hand movement, all of which in principle is 
explainable  by  physical  mechanisms  at  the  level  of  molecules  and  chemi-
cal reactions. 
If the physical components correlating with the thought “I’d like to raise my 
hand” completely explains the physical raising of the hand, then the idea that 
the conscious thought caused the hand to raise has only the appearance of 
a teleological process. The relation between the mere appearance of a teleo-
logical process and the underlying reality of a mechanistic process is the same 
as when birds appear to migrate “for the purpose” of finding a better climate Enactivism and the New Teleology 
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to spend the winter. In reality (in the standard mechanistic scientific account)  
there  ultimately  must  be  micro-level  causal  explanations  for  what  causes 
them to follow the patterns of flight that they follow. The real explanation for 
why they migrate in those patterns has no more to do with the birds’ achiev-
ing a “purpose” than the causal explanation of a giraffe’s long neck is that it 
stretches “in order to” reach the leaves in high branches. To be sure, there are 
natural selection processes at work, but these in turn are ultimately reducible 
to  a  series  of  mechanistic  cause-and-effect  relations.  Natural  selection,  far 
from embracing teleology, actually explains it away. 
In no sense is the giraffe’s long neck mechanically caused by the giraffe’s “hav-
ing a purpose,” nor is the birds’ pattern of migration mechanically caused by 
the purpose of the migration. So if all causation is mechanistic, the “purpose” 
achieved by the birds and the giraffe play no causal role, because this having-
a-purpose does not play the causal role that the underlying mechanistic ante-
cedents play. 
In theory, it has seemed since the inception of “psychology as a science” that 
teleological  explanations  of  human behavior  and  consciousness  must  work 
the same as with the giraffe and the birds. It subjectively appears that our 
having a purpose is what causes us to raise our hand, but the real causal work 
is done by physical antecedents that preceded any subjective impression of 
“having a purpose,” and which are entirely sufficient to explain the resulting 
behavior without reference to any feeling of teleology. In reality, in the domi-
nant streams of purely empirical psychology, our human behavior is as mech-
anistic as any other causal relation. While these mechanisms seem purposeful 
from the subjective perspective, objectively they result from push-pull dynam-
ics. The past is always what causes the future. The same problem presents 
itself  for  other  apparently  purposeful  processes  in  nature,  such  as  the  re-
markable shunt mechanisms in the metabolism of nutrients in animal systems 
and many other non-conscious contexts. Our focus here, however, is the need 
for something resembling a kind of teleology in conscious processes. We will 
see later that the self-organizational theories that reconcile mental with phys-
ical causation are also the same ones that reconcile non-conscious purposeful 
processes with their micro-level efficient causal mechanisms. 
Although many would like to avoid the problems of classical Newtonian me-
chanics  by  explaining  consciousness  at  the  quantum  level  (as  in  Jibu  and 
Yasue 1994; Globus 1992, 2003), in my view this move still cannot avoid the 
problem  of mental causation  and  other  related  contradictions  between the 
subjective  experience  of  teleology  and  the  mechanistic  explanations  of  its 
neurophysiological  correlates.  Even  if  quantum  behavior  does  not  fit  the 
causally closed picture of Newtonian physics, the fact remains that conscious 
processes have been correlated thousands and thousands of times with causal 
mechanisms that do occur at a level where causal closure still obtains. We AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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cannot avoid these correlations by descending to the quantum level of expla-
nation. That move does not erase the correlations. 
Classical Newtonian causal relations are causally closed (as emphasized, for 
example, by Kim 1992, 1993, 1998). If some combination of conditions are suf-
ficient to produce an outcome, then no other condition can be necessary to 
produce that same outcome. Conversely, if  some combination of conditions 
are necessary to produce an outcome, then no other condition can be suffi-
cient to produce that same outcome. The result is that teleological explana-
tions of why and how I raise my hand can make no reference to my subjective 
decision to raise it, because the raising of the hand has been entirely account-
ed for by micro-level physical conditions—unless, of course, I completely re-
duce the conscious event to a physical one, in which case we still are left with 
no teleological causal relations, only mechanistic ones. 
Adding further to the reductionism of this schema is the passive receiving 
model of perception, which leads to stimulus-response explanations of all psy-
chological phenomena, including affective and conscious ones. If I am quietly 
sitting,  without any  light  impinging  on  my  retina,  I do  not  see  any  object. 
When the light hits the retina, I see an object. Many psychologists are content 
to infer that the difference between seeing and not seeing must be caused by 
the  introduction  of  the  light  hitting  my  retina—i.e.,  the  stimulus.  My  con-
sciousness of the stimulus is then the subsequent product of this causal dy-
namic. Consciousness in effect is caused by physical actions done to the body 
by external objects—not by actions initiated by the organism which would 
then use or adapt to the external objects. So consciousness must be an epi-
phenomenon, a mere side effect of the activity of stimuli as they hit my nerv-
ous system and in turn lead to cause and effect mechanisms in it. From this 
standpoint, consciousness is always construed as the last event in a series of 
causes and effects. 
There is of course one easy way out of the standard mental causation prob-
lem.  If  consciousness  is  identical  to  a  physical  process,  then  whatever  is 
caused by that physical process is also caused by the corresponding conscious 
act (as in Smart 1970).  In that case, even a conscious choice could still become 
an intermediate cause in a chain, since it would be identical with some of the 
intermediate physical events in the chain. To be sure, consciousness would 
only be an intermediate step in a chain of mechanistic causes in that case, but 
at least it would play a causal role. 
Up to this point, the dominant schools of empirical psychology have taken this 
intermediate causal role of consciousness to mean that we have a subjective 
reaction  to  a  stimulus  input,  and  a  conditioned  (mechanistic)  response,  of 
which we can form a subsequent subjective impression—as in behaviorism. 
Or this view can be qualified by allowing innate configurations of brain mat-
ter, hormones, and neurotransmitters to partially determine how we respond Enactivism and the New Teleology 
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to a given stimulus—as in the traditional drive theories such as those original-
ly developed by Hull (1952) and Spence (1956; see also Spence and Frith 1999), 
and currently handed down to us by Rolls (1999), LeDoux (1996) and others. 
But of course such a literal psycho-physical identity theory presents a plethora 
of other problems. For example, there is the “hard problem” pointed out by 
Chalmers (1995), which is essentially a special case of Levin’s (1983) “explana-
tory gap” problem. In Chalmers’ formulation, the problem is that, if we can 
explain everything about a physical event, and if the physical event is identi-
cal with a conscious event, then this would mean that we have completely 
explained the conscious event. But the problem is that something would still 
be left unexplained:  Namely, after we have explained what caused physical 
event XYZ to occur, we still would not have explained why an event like XYZ 
should  have  the  property  of  consciousness,  whereas  other  physical  events 
subject to the same kinds of explanations do not have the property of con-
sciousness. To explain what caused XYZ to occur does not explain why XYZ 
has the property of consciousness. Those are two different questions. The sec-
ond one is what Chalmers means by the “hard problem” of consciousness. He 
explicitly distinguishes this from the “easy problems” of consciousness. Ex-
plaining that consciousness always correlates with XYZ is easy. And explain-
ing what caused XYZ to occur is also easy, compared with the “hard problem.” 
Yet one often hears presentations of solutions to these easy problems accom-
panied by the claim that they are solving, or will lead to the solution of the 
“hard problem.” This way of speaking betrays a misunderstanding of what 
Chalmers means by the “hard problem.” 
I use Chalmers’ “hard problem” as only one of many problems that are creat-
ed  by  a  literal  psycho-physical  identity  theory.  As  far  as  teleology  is  con-
cerned, psycho-physical identity remains at odds with it even if we completely 
accept psycho-physical identity. Consciousness is still caused by an interaction 
of mechanistic physical events. And here again, the standard application of 
empirical psychology to this model has been in effect to use stimulus response 
explanations,  combined  with  some  assumptions  about  innate  physiological 
predispositions. The result is that “action” is explained as a series of micro-
level re-actions. We are left with no distinction between action and reaction. 
Clinical psychologists have long wished that there could be such a thing as 
teleology in human processes, because our subjective reporting of what we 
feel to be the purposes of our actions and motivations is largely experienced 
as teleological. I do not experience myself as deciding to listen to Tchaikov-
sky’s Sixth Symphony because some classical or operant conditioning history 
caused something to trigger me to respond to some stimulus in my environ-
ment in some way. My experience is that I first felt a certain way, and because 
I felt that way, I wanted to listen to some music appropriate to that feeling. 
Rather than being caused by the music, the feeling pre-exists and then uses AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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the music. I engage in voluntary actions needed for access to the right kind of 
music—driving to a concert hall or playing a disk on a stereo. 
The  enactive  approaches  to  psychology  offer  the  kind  of  teleology  that  is 
needed here. As the name implies, enactivism begins with the idea that there 
is such a thing as action—not merely a sequence of re-actions. As is now well 
known, new scientific work on the theory of self-organization in certain kinds 
of physical systems promises to allow the whole organism to act from its own 
self-initiated motivations, and not merely to react or to display a complicated 
system of reactions (see Kauffman 1993; Monod 1971; Newton 1996, 2000; Ellis 
and Newton 2010; Ellis 2005). 
The distinction between action and reaction, construed scientifically, can be 
grounded in the idea of complex dynamical systems, which I take as synony-
mous with self-organizing systems. As Newton (2000) defines it, a dynamical 
system is a thermodynamic system that maintains the continuity of its func-
tional patterns while exchanging energy and materials with the environment. 
Such a system acts as a whole to seek out, select, appropriate, rearrange, and 
reproduce the micro-constituents  needed to keep  its  ongoing pattern going 
with continuity. As Thompson (2007) suggests, the pattern uses its parts to 
maintain the continuation of the pattern and, within the limits of its situation, 
replaces the parts as needed for this purpose. 
We must be very careful to avoid facile explanations of the relationship be-
tween the mechanistic level and the self-organizational level of causal analy-
sis. Locutions like “the higher level of organization constrains what can hap-
pen at the lower level” (as in Thelen and Smith 1994; Globus 2003) may be 
satisfying for some purposes, but they do not answer the crucial questions 
about causation.  In classical mechanical causation,  which  the  neurons and 
neurotransmitters of the brain are observed to obey quite consistently, the 
cause (or combination of causes) is necessary and sufficient for its effects un-
der the given background conditions. This is as true for turning on an electric 
light as for shunt mechanisms in biological organisms. So if saying that the 
higher level “constrains” what the lower level can do simply means that lower 
level causal relations are sufficient only after we have assumed that certain 
background  conditions  are  in  place  (for  example,  a  good  bulb  in  the  light 
socket and a complete electrical circuit), then we still have not distinguished 
between linear and complex dynamical causal systems. We need to be careful 
to give a coherent explanation as to how a higher-level of organization “con-
straining” the lower level is any different from any other causal situation. 
How are self-organizing systems different from non-self-organizing ones? 
In my view, the difference hinges on the fact that, in self-organizing systems, 
the system as whole displays a tendency for its various components to be re-
arranged  when  needed  to  provide  the  background  conditions  that  are  as-
sumed by a needed micro-level causal relation (Kauffman 1993; Monod 1971). Enactivism and the New Teleology 
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We do not need for this overall plasticity to be devoid of previous mechanistic 
explanations for how it initially achieved the plastic condition—for example, 
the  micro-level  reactions  that  occurred  during  embryonic  development  (as 
both Kauffman and Monod point out). The point is that very early in the etiol-
ogy of a self-organizing system, it acquires a tendency to rearrange its own 
components in such a way that the structural integrity of the whole is main-
tained by constantly rearranging the background conditions needed for the 
given micro-level linear reaction to occur (see Ellis and Newton 2010). This is 
the sense in which the overall causal situation is different from simply a com-
bination of linear reactions.  The whole system seeks out, appropriates, rear-
ranges and replaces its own parts as needed to maintain the pattern of the 
whole or to change the pattern in ways called for by the needs of the whole 
system. We see this in many examples of neural plasticity, such as in stroke 
recovery (Restak 1984: 256; Springer and Deutch 1981: 173-212), in recovery 
from memory loss from head injuries (Restak 1984:. 360ff; Wrightson 1989), 
and in drug addiction (in which neurotransmitter receptors change their size 
and number to avoid imbalances resulting from the substances that are over-
supplied by the drug user—for example, see Valenstein 2002, Chapter 5). 
How can such a dynamical systems approach avoid the problems of previous 
mechanistic explanations? Is the dynamical system merely an epiphenome-
non of the entire series of mechanistic interactions of its components, and 
thus in reality only a series of reactions after all? Does the system as a whole 
actually violate causal closure in ways that would contradict a huge mass of 
empirical evidence suggesting that there are systematic correlations between 
physical cause-effect sequences and conscious events? Or is the action of the 
dynamical system somehow “compatible with” the mechanistic explanation of 
the behavior of its micro-level constituents? Those are pressing problems that 
enactivism must face if it is to ground itself in action in a meaningful sense, 
rather than only an epiphenomenal appearance of action. 
The new approach has arisen partly from a rejection of some of the assump-
tions of the stimulus-response and passive-reaction models of the past century 
These assumptions, as we have seen, led to the relegating of consciousness to 
an epiphenomenal role in philosophy and science. They ultimately stem from 
the assumption that the reality which ultimately must explain all causation is 
thoroughly  “bottom-up,”  with  the  real  causal  work  done  at  an  atomistic-
reductionist  level;  that  representational  conscious  activities  (thoughts  and 
perceptions) are clearly distinguishable from non-representational ones (feel-
ings and emotions); and, perhaps most important, that all reality is fundamen-
tally reactive and passive rather than active—i.e., that nothing does anything 
unless caused to do it by some external force acting on it, that there is no such 
thing as a pattern of activity which organizes its own substrata rather than the 
other way around. In short, for “modernist” metaphysics (as postmodernists 
like Globus, 1992, 2003 call it), there was no important or non-arbitrary dis-AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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tinction between non-living things and living ones (i.e., those which appropri-
ate,  rearrange,  and  reproduce  the  needed  substrata  in  order  to  maintain 
a higher-order pattern of activity); yet the difference between conscious be-
ings and non-conscious ones (e.g., computers) would need to hinge crucially 
on this distinction. 
 
What is needed for a teleological yet scientific  
analysis of intentional actions 
In the modernist framework as applied to psychology and cognitive neurosci-
ence, consciousness is a causal result of a stimulus input which then gets pro-
cessed in the brain. Perceptual consciousness is thus assumed to result from 
stimulation of the occipital lobe and V4 visual areas, as a result in turn of a 
perceptual object’s stimulating the nervous system. Thomas Natsoulas (1994) 
calls  this  approach  an  “appendage”  theory  of  consciousness—the  idea  that 
consciousness is a byproduct of a cause and effect mechanism but does not 
have the power to act as a cause itself. But there are problems with trying to 
interpret perceptual consciousness in this way. 
For example, it has often been observed that occipital activation in response 
to incoming visual data often results in no perceptual consciousness.  Addi-
tionally, it is necessary that the parietal and frontal lobes must also play an 
active role (Farah 1989; Luria 1980; Posner 1980, 1990; Posner and Petersen 
1990); and it is well established that this activation of the parietal and frontal 
lobes is not simply caused by the earlier activation of the occipital cortex (Au-
rell 1989). As I discussed more extensively elsewhere (Ellis 1995, 2005), the 
parietal lobe is almost immediately adjacent to the occipital lobe, yet in the 
process of generation of a conscious perceptual experience, the parietal lobe is 
not active until about a third of a second after the occipital lobe is activated 
when a novel stimulus is presented (Runeson 1974; Srebro 1985; McHugh and 
Bahill 1985). Given that nerve impulses travel at about 100 miles per hour, 
why should it take a third of a second to travel only a few millimeters?  
If the imaginative activity of the parietal lobe were really caused by the nerve 
impulse which travels to it from the occipital lobe, the impulse should be de-
livered virtually instantaneously. Whatever is happening during this third of 
a second that is also needed in order for consciousness of the object to occur 
cannot be caused by the passive receiving of the nerve impulse to the parietal 
lobe from the occipital lobe, which in turn receives it from the incoming stim-
ulus. If so, the spreading of activation would be much quicker than a third of 
a second;  it  would  be  virtually  instantaneous.  Thus  it  appears  that  the  re-
sponse is not caused by the stimulus. 
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This paradox arises only if we assume that the parietal lobe (which is active 
when we are conscious of visual images) can only be activated as a result of 
prior occipital activity, which in turn results from prior optic stimulation orig-
inating from the environment. But recent research shows that this is not the 
case. Instead, what happens is that, prior to occipital processing of the visual 
stimulus, the parietal lobe has already been activated by the frontal lobe (as 
shown by Aurell 1989, Damasio et al. 2000, and many others), which in turn is 
activated by the midbrain, which is the focus of  emotional-motivational activ-
ity as triggered by thalamic arousal by the stimulus only if the stimulus is gen-
erally felt as possibly emotionally important for the organism's purposes (Lu-
ria 1980; Posner 1990; Damasio 1994). The needs of the organism as a whole 
must first motivate the asking of questions about what kinds of environmental 
stimuli  might  be  important  for  the  organism's  purposes;  at  this  point,  the 
frontal lobe becomes active. As these questions are formulated with the help 
of the frontal lobe, the parietal lobe then begins to entertain vague images 
and/or concepts of the kinds of emotionally important objects that might be 
present in the environment. If and when this frontal-limbic-parietal activity, 
once having been developed, finds itself resonating with patterns of activity in 
the occipital lobe (which reflects sensory stimulation)—only then does percep-
tual consciousness occur.  
The one-third-second delay does not result from any slowing of the incoming 
nerve impulse as it “travels” from the occipital lobe to the parietal lobe. The 
parietal lobe (which is active when we are conscious of visual images) is not 
activated in  response to the occipital lobe's activity at all. Instead, the organ-
ism must purposely activate the frontal and parietal lobes to “look for” emo-
tionally important categories of objects which the thalamus has already alert-
ed the organism  might be relevant, and this “looking for” activity has already 
begun the forming of visual or conceptual imagery (including proprioceptive 
and sensorimotor imagery)  prior to any occipital activity's having any effect 
on our perceptual consciousness (since at this point the impulse has not yet 
“traveled” from the occipital to the parietal lobe). As Thompson (2007), Noë 
(2006), and Ellis and Newton (2010) formulate this process, the organism is 
always already engaged in a series of both conscious and non-conscious ac-
tions, and then makes an assessment  of  the  environment based  on  how  it 
seems to facilitate or thwart the process. Neurophysiologically, the prefrontal 
cortex’s  searching  function  and  the  hippocampal  and  amygdala  emotional 
processes are already active long before the occipital perceptual processing 
occurs (Damasio et al. 1990; Haines et al. 1997). 
On the enactivist account of intentionality, the organism must act on its envi-
ronment  in  order  to  be  conscious  of  it;  consciousness  cannot  result  from 
a mere passive  reaction to  incoming  input.  On  this  view,  the  model  of  the 
mind as a passive receiver of causal work done by stimulus inputs and other 
mechanical computations is backwards in some important respects. The or-AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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ganism must first purposely act, and only then can consciousness of the envi-
ronment  result.  It  is  this  fundamental  shift  in  the  direction  of  causation 
which is  now  sometimes  referred  to  as  the  “enactive”  view  of  the  mind—
a term coined by  Varela  et.  al.  (1991/1993).  Rather  than a  stimulus causing 
a response, it is the response which must occur  first, and then act on the in-
coming  afferent  signals  to  produce  a  stimulus.  We  might  call  this  enac-
tive approach  the  current  “Copernican  revolution”  in  cognitive  theory 
and neuroscience. 
 
The sensorimotor account of intentionality 
The philosopher Natika Newton has elaborated an entire theory of conscious-
ness around the notion that, in effect, we must subliminally use “sensorimotor 
action images” to imagine the action affordances of objects in order to be con-
sciously aware of them (this careful analysis is developed through a sequence 
of detailed studies, including Newton 1982, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2000). 
According to Newton, perceptual consciousness is always preceded by an act 
of imagination. We first imagine ways in which we could possibly act in rela-
tion to the object at hand. The action motivated by the action planning process 
creates an  “anticipation” as  to possible  environmental feedback,  and  these 
anticipations  constitute  mental  images.  If  the  anticipations  are  fulfilled  by 
correlative perceptual input, the result is a percept; if the anticipations are not 
fulfilled, then the result often is still a state of consciousness, but the state con-
sists only of a mental image of a non-present object or state of affairs. The 
anticipation, however, must precede the effect of the incoming data from the 
senses  on  our  perceptual  consciousness.  Subjunctive  ideas  about  imagined 
possibilities for action are thus prior to perceptual input, and action planning 
guides the process of “looking for” instantiations of the subjunctive category 
(for example, the image) as actually instantiated in the environment. For ex-
ample, perceptual studies by Runeson (1974), Srebro (1985) and others show 
that an object previously anticipated is much more readily perceived. 
Newton’s theory is a clearly articulated example of an enactivist account in 
which consciousness must play an active role in the context of the experience 
of humans and other higher animals. The role it plays is similar to the “prag-
matic” role that Marcelo Dascal (1987) assigns to it in bringing about the kind 
of information processing that is accompanied by conscious experience. But if 
the organism must act in this sense, it is not merely reacting to stimuli, and 
therefore is not an easy fit to the notion of an epiphenomenon or “appendage” 
to a basically non-conscious computational process. This aspect of the enactiv-
ist account builds from the foundation established by J.J. Gibson (1986) in his 
notion of “affordances.” We understand and identify an object by imagining 
how it would be possible for our bodies to act in relation to the object. Newton 
and  other  recent  enactivists  use  neurological  work  (for  example,  Damasio Enactivism and the New Teleology 
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1994;  Posner1990;  Farah  1989;  Luria  1980;  Cytowic  1993),  and  research  on 
mental  imagery  (for  example,  the  “mental  models”  developed  by  Johnson-
Laird and Byrne 1991) to show how action planning grounds our understand-
ing of objects, and ultimately of language, concepts, and logical relations. An 
infant  identifies  objects  in  terms  of whether  they  “afford sucking,”  “afford 
throwing,” etc. 
This imagistic account can ground our understanding of logical relations be-
cause subjunctive action affordances allow us to imagine what would happen 
“if” such and such circumstances were to obtain. For example, to anticipate 
that “If I throw a ball at something  it will knock it over,” is very similar to 
believing that “If I were to throw a ball, it would knock something over.” Thus 
anticipations  of  the  future  ground  our  understanding  of  subjunctives  and 
therefore allow a grasping of abstract logical concepts. In Newton's approach, 
the key to this “foundation of understanding” is the process of action plan-
ning. This theory is consistent with a host of neurophysiological findings—for 
example,  that  the  brain  mechanisms  underlying  abstract  thought  are  very 
similar to those underlying action-planning in the context of body movement 
(Ito 1993; Damasio 1994). 
The crucial point for our purposes here is that, in the enactivist approach, the 
modernist biases mentioned above become questionable and a new paradigm 
suggests itself. Because the organism must anticipate actions toward its envi-
ronment in order for consciousness to occur, consciousness is not merely pas-
sively caused by incoming stimuli or unconscious computations performed on 
incoming stimuli. The body's organization of stimuli occurs prior to the recep-
tion of the stimuli, and if the body does not actively seek to appropriate and 
rearrange the physiological substrata for its own desired patterns of conscious 
activity, this consciousness can never occur. 
In a sense, we could think of the relationship between neurons and the pat-
tern of activity that constitutes consciousness as similar to the relationship 
between the molecules of wood in a door and the sound wave that passes 
through the door. The wave is composed of a pattern of the movements of the 
wood particles, but we would not want to “explain” the wave by reference to 
the door. The door does not cause the wave, but on the contrary, the wave 
causes the particles in the wooden door to conform to its pattern as it passes 
through the door. 
Correlatively,  an  enactive  approach  such  as  Newton's  or  Varela's  requires 
a rejection of the epiphenomenalist account of consciousness as merely the tip 
of an iceberg which consists of unconscious computational brain processes. 
Instead,  consciousness directs much  of  this activity,  and  much  of  it  would 
never take place without the direction of consciousness; yet it is important 
that consciousness itself is embodied—not in computational cerebral process-
es, but rather in emotional and motivational activities of the whole organism. AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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It is the emotionally motivated process of action planning that directs the fo-
cus of conscious attention, not a computer-like computational process. 
For the same reasons, enactivism must reject the modernist assumption that 
representational states (thoughts and perceptions) are caused by perceptual 
inputs. In fact, in the enactivist account, representational processes are not 
even  clearly  distinguishable  from  non-representational  ones  (feelings  and 
emotions). Emotion and motivation direct the action imagery that grounds the 
experience of the action affordances of objects. The purposes of the whole 
embodied organism come into play in directing conscious attention. Much of 
our rational processing, for the reasons that I sketched earlier, results from 
what Newton calls “proprioceptive imagery.” In proprioceptive imagery, we 
imagine what it would be like to perform a bodily action, and this in turn 
grounds the understanding of a subjunctive concept of such a movement and 
of the environmental objects that afford it. The understanding of “what would 
happen if...”  grounds our learning of which kinds of logical inferences can be 
relied upon as we go through life. And much of this action imagery can occur 
on  a  subliminal  or  pre-conscious  basis.  Only  in  the  presence  of  a  strong 
enough motivating selective attention process and a suitable environmental 
context (or a sufficiently rich imagining of one), does consciousness accompa-
ny the action imagery. 
In essence, twentieth century empirical psychology was built on an ontology 
of the physical world in which everything is fundamentally reactive rather 
than consisting of patterns of activity which appropriate their atomistic com-
ponents. When scientists tried to apply this passive ontology to the explana-
tion of consciousness, the result was that no explanation was possible. The 
easy  problems  of  consciousness  could  be  addressed,  but  no  attempt  could 
even be made at the “hard problem.” The next section will consider the ad-
vantages of enactivism in making more sense out of the relationship between 
consciousness  and  the  natural  world  than  was  possible  in  the  passive-
receiving model of the mind and the epiphenomenalist conceptualization of 
the relevant causal relations. 
 
How enactivism can confront the “hard problem” head-on 
The approach that I have been outlining is equipped to offer a new perspec-
tive on Chalmers' (1995) “hard problem” of consciousness. Computationalists 
had maintained throughout most of the twentieth century that consciousness 
can be explained either as an epiphenomenon of, or as identical with, a digital 
computer-like  process  which  uses  the  hardware of  the  brain  to process  its 
software. The point of Chalmers’ “hard problem” is that we can easily imagine 
such a computational process as occurring in the absence of consciousness. 
Therefore, some further explanation is required in order to understand why Enactivism and the New Teleology 
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consciousness does in fact accompany such computational processes in cer-
tain cases (for example, in human organisms). 
The enactive approach we have been discussing avoids this problem because 
it focuses on elements of consciousness as actually phenomenally experienced 
that were left out of the traditional computationalist model—elements that 
lend themselves to being correlated with action-oriented as opposed to pas-
sive-receiving physiological substrata. It is not so easy to imagine that this 
teleological or action-initiating combination of physiological substrata, includ-
ing emotionally motivated selective attention, imagery, and resulting action, 
could have occurred unaccompanied by its conscious correlates. For example, 
consider the enactive model of consciousness that Newton and I described in 
a co-authored article and subsequent further elaboration in book form (Ellis 
and  Newton  1998,  2010).  On  the  formulation  developed  there,  conscious-
ness requires  
an interested anticipation of possible sensory and proprioceptive input such 
that the pattern of the subject's interest determines the modality, patterns, and 
emotional significance of the anticipated input. Specifically, the anticipation 
takes  the  form  of  a  sensorimotor,  proprioceptive  and  affective  “image”  of 
a state of affairs “looked for” by the subject.... The content of consciousness is 
vivid to the extent that the activity constitutive of the interest in the future 
resonates (in terms of holistic patterns of activity) with the activity of incom-
ing (afferent) imagistic data and with activation of memories of past imagistic 
and conceptual data. (Ellis and Newton 1998: 432) 
Subjects  can  actually  experience  this  effect  in  perceptual  attention  experi-
ments. When the subjects are instructed in such a way that they are anticipat-
ing an object before it is presented, they perceive it more readily (Corbetta 
1990; Pardo  et al 1990; Logan 1980; Hanze and Hesse 1993; Legrenzi et al 
1993; Rhodes and Tremewan 1993; Lavy and van den Hout 1994). Posner and 
Rothbart (1992) report that "During vigilant states the posterior attention net-
work can interact more efficiently with the object recognition system of the 
ventral occipital lobe (96)." This attentional process "increases the probability 
of being able to detect the relevant signal (97)." Imagining a given object in-
volves a process that is very similar, both phenomenologically and neurophys-
iologically, to “looking for” an object of that type, even if we are aware that we 
will not find it in the actual current environment. When I form a mental im-
age of the pink wall as blue, I am executing many of the same brain processes 
as when I “look for” or “anticipate” blue in the wall, even though I do not find 
the  blue  I  am  “looking  for”  in  this  particular  wall.  As  Merleau-Ponty  says, 
"I give ear, or look, in the expectation of a sensation, and suddenly the sensi-
ble takes possession of my ear or my gaze, and I surrender a part of my body, 
even my whole body, to this particular manner of vibrating and filling space 
known as blue or red" (1962: 212). Later he sums up in this way: "It is neces-
sary to ‘look’ in order to see" (1962: 232). And "The warmth which I feel when AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
 
187 
 
I read the word 'warm' is not an actual warmth. It is simply my body which 
prepares itself for heat and which, so to speak, roughs out its outline" (1962: 
236).  Helmholtz (1962) makes a similar point which is now widely accepted 
among neurologists: "We let our eyes traverse all the noteworthy points of the 
object one after another." I.e., the organism must actively search for infor-
mation in the environment before that information is consciously seen. Vision 
is active, not passive. 
One  of  the  main  differences  between  conscious  and  non-conscious  infor-
mation processing (as in nuts and bolts computers) is that consciousness in-
volves an emotionally interested anticipation of a possible or actual stimulus 
input (Cytowic 1993). In order to be conscious of a specific input, we must  
actively and  motivatedly  “pay  attention,” as  inattentional blindness  experi-
ments clearly show (Mack and Rock 1998; Ellis 2005). The action of  directing 
attention, like any other action, must be motivated by the needs of the organ-
ism. To be sure, afferent processing involving the occipital lobe is part of what 
produces conscious awareness of an object, but this awareness also requires 
corticothalamic loops instigated by subcortical motivational activity and the 
cooperation of frontal-limbic loops with the anterior cingulate (see Bachmann 
2000;  Lethin  2002,  2005;  Posner  and  Rothbart  1992;  Damasio  1994;  Farah 
1989; Aurell 1989; Luria 1980.) In the enactive approach, the primary organ-
ismic need that motivates consciousness of objects is the need to anticipate 
future data  which  are  considered  important  for  the  organism's  purposes 
(Dennett 1996). 
The emotionally motivated anticipation of input leads to “imagery” in an en-
activist rather than modernist sense. In enactivist terms, an “image” is not 
a physical replica or “encoding” of the object in the brain, but rather an enact-
ing of the process that one would undergo if perceiving the object—in other 
words, on my formulation, a sense that we are looking for (or listening for, 
tasting for, proprioceptively feeling for, etc.) an object or state of affairs in 
a widely distributed neurophysiological pattern similar to what would be exe-
cuted if we were to actually see, hear, or taste it. This idea is highly consistent 
with Walter Freeman’s (1991) findings, for example that cats activate their 
olfactory patterns merely in anticipation of the presentation of the smell of 
fish, before the smell is actually presented. It is also consistent with the now 
familiar finding that imagining a given action activates most of the same brain 
processes as actually executing the action. Jeannerod (1994, 1997), for exam-
ple,  explains  that  when  we  imagine  a movement,  we  execute  all  the  same 
brain processes as in actually doing the movement, but at the same time we 
inhibit the action command at the point when it would feed forward to the 
body’s extremities in order for the action to be carried out. 
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When  we  say  that  consciousness  is  distinguished  from  non-conscious  pro-
cessing by being emotionally motivated, this should not be taken as implying 
that  emotions  and  motivations  are  necessarily  conscious.  There  are  non-
conscious yet purposive phenomena in nature, especially in biological organ-
isms. For example, the human organism purposefully does what is necessary 
to regulate its heartbeat and blood pressure, yet normally is not conscious of 
doing so. Merleau-Ponty (1941) defines a “purposeful organism” as one which 
changes, replaces, or readjusts the functioning of its own parts according to 
what is needed to maintain or enhance the existence and functioning of the 
whole organism. The purpose-directing role of emotion is not a sufficient con-
dition for consciousness, but in the enactivist account as I have formulated it, 
emotion and motivation are necessary conditions. 
It is true that we can have interested anticipations of the future in this sense 
without any experienced consciousness. This can occur because, throughout 
nature, there is purposeful activity without conscious awareness, because self-
organization  in  complex  systems  can  occur  in  various  contexts  throughout 
nature. It is also true that we can process  afferent data without conscious-
ness,  as in “blindsight” phenomena. And of course there is also holistic pro-
cessing without consciousness, as in typical holograms. There are also some-
times non-conscious interests alongside of non-conscious data processing, but 
without consciousness. We can even have non-conscious  anticipations of the 
future, as in operant conditioning, juxtaposed with non-conscious activations 
of stored information or of present afferent activity, with no consciousness of 
the process. 
So enactivists should be careful not to try to explain consciousness in terms of 
any one of these elements without the needed contextualization in relation to 
the others—as for example people sometimes speak as if complex dynamical 
systems could automatically explain what makes something conscious.  
Consciousness requires that the interest in the future is neurophysiologically 
instantiated so as to give rise to an image of a possible future. In the case of 
perceptual consciousness, this same activity  resonates with afferent activity 
stimulated by input.  The interest in the future, the forming of the image, and 
the  processing  of  the  sensory  or  sensorimotor  data must all  resonate  with 
each other as the motivation gives rise to the “looking-for” which then directs 
our attention. The degree of resonance among these activities corresponds to 
the  vividness  of the  consciousness.  The quality  of  experience as  “stretched 
out” over the three temporal moments—present, immediately retained just-
past, and anticipated future—also leads to a feeling of an inseparable blending 
of feeling with the intending of an object, and even a fuzziness in distinguish-
ing subject from object (as when we attribute the phenomenal redness of an 
object to the object itself, as if the red were pasted to the surface of the object, 
or when we attribute the mood that an object produces in us to the object it-AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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self). This blending accounts for a good deal of the fact that we usually focus 
our attention on the object of experience rather than our subjective experi-
encing of it. Here again, what is subjective and what is objective about our 
experience of reality is in principle not a clear or sharp distinction. 
Consciousness cannot be understood as a passive causal result of the actions 
of the substratum elements that make up the components forming the higher-
order process that allows for the active nature of consciousness.  Conscious-
ness is self-organizational in a biological way. The higher-level process seeks 
out,  appropriates,  re-arranges,  and  within  certain  limits  even  replaces  the 
micro-level constituents needed to enact its dynamical patterns of organiza-
tion. Consciousness is not simply caused by its micro-level physical compo-
nents, but neither is it separable from them.  The enactive approach meets 
this demand by conceiving of consciousness as a self-organizing process that 
is inseparable from its micro-constituents in the sense that it could not occur 
without them, yet it is not passively  caused by the actions of those substrata. 
But this theory in turn requires a careful scientific grounding of the causal 
relations required to maintain the regularly observed “causal closure” at the 
micro level, as our next section will discuss. 
 
The compatibility of dynamical systems with micro-level  
mechanistic explanation 
There is now a mass of empirical evidence pointing to the thesis that pro-
cessing occurs in a conscious way only when it is very globally distributed in 
the brain. For example, we know that, when impulses caused by optic stimula-
tion set up patterns of activity in the occipital lobe, but without coordinated 
limbic and frontal-cortex activity, no perceptual consciousness results from 
the occipital activity (Posner 1990; Damasio et al. 2000; Eslinger and Damasio 
1985; Nauta 1971; Luria 1980). Similarly, the transition from sleep to waking 
consciousness  requires  that  the  activities  of  the  hypothalamus  and  cortex 
achieve a pattern of synchronization or coordination which was not present 
during  sleep (Asimov  1965:  193;  Ellis  1986:  46-52).  When  we are conscious 
of dream images during sleep, both efferent and afferent activity throughout 
the  brain  are  detected,  whereas  during  non-dreaming  sleep  both  the  affe-
rent activity and some of the efferent activity are comparatively much less 
pronounced  (Winson  1986:  46ff;  Restak  1984:  315-333;  Richardson  1991; 
Jouvet 1967).  
Another example is provided by the 1/3-second time delay from the activation 
of the occipital lobe (in response to a novel stimulus) to the presence of per-
ceptual consciousness  of  the  object,  the  latter  correlating  with  coordinated 
limbic, frontal, parietal, and occipital activity (Aurell 1989; Runeson 1974: 14; 
Srebro 1985: 233-46). EEG and other electrical measures show that parietal Enactivism and the New Teleology 
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activation does not occur until 1/3 second after the occipital activity, which by 
itself does not produce consciousness of the object. As we saw earlier, the ac-
tivation does not merely “travel” from the occipital to the adjacent parietal 
area; if it did, the distance involved would be traversed in much less time than 
1/3  second.  Instead,  before  perceptual  consciousness  can  occur,  the  limbic 
system must be aroused, and it in turn must activate the frontal lobe to begin 
formulating questions about what the nature of the interesting or important 
environmental stimulus might be, which then activates ideas and/or images in 
the form of anticipations of possible perceptions with the help of the parietal 
lobe (Ellis 1995, Ch. 1; Luria 1980; Posner and Rothbart 1992). Only as a result 
of this symphonic orchestration of global activity can the activity of the parie-
tal  lobe  be matched against  what  is  happening  in  the  occipital  lobe  to see 
whether the image or idea hypothesized is actually instantiated in the envi-
ronment. If so, perceptual consciousness of the corresponding object occurs. If 
not, a mere mental image of the object experienced as non-present occurs in 
consciousness. In either event, consciousness occurs only when brain activi-
ties are globally coordinated. What these examples and many others suggest is 
that consciousness requires globally distributed processes in the brain, com-
bining local mechanisms which under different circumstances would be ac-
tive in various non-conscious processes. Luria (1980), Posner (1990), Posner 
and Rothbart (1992), and many other neurologists are now convinced that the 
prefrontal  lobe plays  a crucial  role  in  the  process  of  directing attention  to 
what is important. What makes it do so is that it receives rich input from the 
limbic system (importantly involved in motivational feelings and other “valu-
ations”), and then sends signals that coordinate the remainder of the cortex to 
be  consciously  aware  of  the  arousing  situation  and  to devise  ways  to  deal 
with it. 
Neither dualism, nor psychophysical identity theory, nor epiphenomenalism 
works as an explanation of the relation between consciousness and its physio-
logical correlates,  because  the modernist  concept  of  atomistic-reductionism 
does  not allow a process  to affect  the  behavior of  its  own  substratum  ele-
ments, but requires that a process must be caused by the interaction of the 
discrete movements of its substratum elements, each of which has a sufficient 
causal explanation of its own, so that the pattern of consciousness, paradoxi-
cally, can have no causal power. 
But the enactive approach avoids this aspect of the problem of causal closure, 
because it does allow that a process can have causal power. The necessary and 
sufficient causal antecedent of an outcome in a self-organizing dynamical sys-
tem is a previous pattern of functioning, which can be realized by alternative 
sets of micro-constituents. None of the particular micro-constituents are strict-
ly necessary, because others could have been used to maintain the same pro-
cess. But not only is the process multiply realizable. In self-organizing sys-
tems, the entity defined by the overall process makes use of the fact of multi-AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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ple  realizability  by  seeking  out,  appropriating,  and  replacing  the  micro-
constituents needed to keep the process going in its definitive pattern. 
Causal closure is nonetheless still maintained in this case because a process is 
inseparable, under the given circumstances (but only under those given cir-
cumstances), from the behavior of its actual micro-constituents or substratum 
elements. So the process will also be necessary and sufficient for whatever its 
substratum  elements  are  necessary  and  sufficient  for,  under  those  specific 
circumstances. Yet this does not necessarily imply that the process is caused 
by its substratum, or that it is identical with it. Many things are true of a pro-
cess which are not true of its substratum elements, even taken collectively. 
For example, a wave on the ocean may travel many miles in a horizontal di-
rection, while its substratum elements, the movements of particles of water, 
are very small vertical oscillations. 
The reason the process can have this kind of power to rearrange its own sub-
stratum elements in such a “plastic” way is that causal antecedents are neces-
sary and sufficient for their consequents only when certain background condi-
tions are in place. The power of the process is that it can alter the background 
conditions themselves, because the process is arranged in such a way that 
shunt mechanisms will kick in when a preferred causal relation (such as a 
chemical reaction) fails to occur. There are multiple cause-and-effect sequenc-
es that can lead to the same pattern being maintained, depending on which 
sets of background conditions are in place. What is really necessary and suffi-
cient for a given outcome is that a previous process have been in place—not 
simply a series of micro-reactions, as if those micro-reactions were not de-
pendent on a larger set of background conditions being in place. 
The process-substratum relation in the case of consciousness is different from 
the relationship between a wave and the physical medium through which the 
wave  passes, such as a  sound  wave,  in  one  crucial  respect.  Consciousness, 
unlike a sound wave or a wave in the ocean, is a purpose-directed process. 
Merleau-Ponty (1942/1967: 47ff) defines a purposeful activity as one in which 
the organism's overall pattern of activity acts in such a way as to rearrange 
and readjust its various parts in order to maintain or enhance the overall pat-
tern. Purely mechanical processes do not seem to behave in this way. A ther-
mostat, while it will adjust its overall pattern to feedback from the environ-
ment, does not seem to be a purpose-directed system because, when one of its 
parts ceases to function or is removed, the thermostat does not act in such 
a way as to replace the missing part or try to compensate for its absence; it 
simply  quits  functioning.  The  thermostat  does  not  “care,”  in  this  non-
conscious sense of “care,” whether it achieves its ultimate objective or not. 
It  functions  or  not  purely  as  an  additive  juxtaposition  of  the  functioning 
of its parts. Enactivism and the New Teleology 
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It becomes increasingly clear, as we study the brain, the ecosystem, and the 
concept of “living organisms” in biology, that at least many patterns of activity 
maintain their organizational structure across replacements of their own sub-
strata. As Merleau-Ponty suggests, an organism will often rearrange the over-
all configuration of its parts if an imbalance is created in one part which dis-
rupts the functioning of the whole. "'Forms' . . . are defined as total processes 
whose properties are not the sum of those which the isolated parts would pos-
sess. . . . We will say that there is form whenever the properties of a system 
are modified by every change brought about in a single one of its parts and, 
on the contrary, are conserved when they all change while maintaining the 
same relationship among themselves" (Merleau-Ponty 1942/1967: 47). 
Examples of self-directed neurophysiological reorganization following local-
ized brain injury or trauma can be found in Restak (1984: 360ff). Kandel and 
Schwartz (1981) also emphasize the “plasticity” of the brain in reorganizing 
itself to accomplish its objectives by getting around disruptions in one way or 
another. For example, if brain cells of an embryo are transplanted to a differ-
ent region of another embryo, they are transformed into cells appropriate to 
that region. This plasticity in the realizability of the mental functions of living 
beings has been discussed by Bechtel and Mundale (1999), Gillett (2003), Hor-
gan (1992) and Bickle (2006). An example of multiple realization is that the 
organism's desires intend to remove the inevitability of electrochemical im-
balance within the organism, not merely by eliminating this or that electrical 
imbalance (for example, in cases where to do so would only transmit the im-
balance from one part of the nervous system to another, or from one bodily 
system to another), but rather by changing the context which renders the im-
balance inevitable—for example, by spatially removing the entire organism 
from  the  disturbing  stimulus,  by  destroying  the  disturbing  stimulus,  or  by 
finding or creating a stimulus in relation to which the whole organism's bal-
ance can be restored. 
 
Conclusion 
The twentieth century philosophy of mind made every effort to remain tena-
ciously bottom-up. Cognitive functions have been explained as “responses” to 
incoming “stimuli,” with the stimuli combining in complex ways to mechani-
cally  cause  the  response.  The  response  is  thus  a  purely  passive  change, 
brought about by the stimulus. As in the characteristic twentieth century ap-
proach to natural science, here too the only inertia is an inertia of passivity; 
nothing would move or change unless acted upon by an outside force. 
In order to overcome the problems we have just outlined, an adequate con-
ception of consciousness must reopen these questions with regard to ontology 
and the theory of causation. We must develop a theory in which purposeful AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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processes are able to appropriate their needed substratum elements, rather 
than merely being passive epiphenomena of them or ontologically identical 
with them. This in turn will require the development of a workable account of 
how it is that certain activities can be “purposeful” in a scientifically intelligi-
ble universe. The mainstream of twentieth century psychology predominantly 
turned its back on this problem. Purposeful activity was explained away as 
a purely mechanical process that only appears, anthropomorphically, as if it 
were purposeful. The standard explanation was that we view a mechanical 
process as if it were purposeful because we view it as if it were conscious, like 
ourselves, and we imagine that if we were to engage in that activity, we would 
be doing so with the consciousness of some purpose in mind. But to character-
ize a process as purposeful is not to anthropomorphize. The human organism 
was purposeful before it was conscious—for example, during embryonic de-
velopment. Consciousness is not necessary to purposefulness, even in the hu-
man organism. So purposefulness cannot be explained simply as the addition 
of consciousness to a process that otherwise could be explained simply as one 
that displays certain “tendencies” to accomplish certain results, as if the only 
difference between a purposeful and a non-purposeful process were that, in 
the latter, there is conscious awareness of an underlying sequence of purely 
passive reactions. The new theories of self-organization that are now available 
can be applied to understanding the causal power of a process over its own 
components, and thus the teleological nature of consciousness as well as many 
other purpose-directed processes in nature, such as the migration of birds, or 
the balance of ecosystems. 
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